"You expect the other purely-selfish farmer to try to steal from you anyways, though.  So you might as well steal from them first.  We could suppose that whoever carries out the theft first has a few days of plenty eating their stolen food, before the other farmer can prepare and execute a plan to steal back food."

"We could skip the part where it's a fake bear attack.  We could even skip the part where the paired thefts occur, and go directly to them spending a lot of time guarding their grain.  70-70 payoff at the end."

"But in fact, yeah, you might suspect intuitively that somehow two purely selfish farmers in this situation would manage to reason that, if they kicked off a cycle of thefts and guarding, they'd both be worse off.  And so long as no theft had yet occurred - they would both think - maybe the two of them could, somehow, end up doing something else which is not that."

"This is the great will to do Something Else Which Is Not That, and end up Not There, which is sometimes said in dath ilan - though the truth is not known - to perhaps be the reason why Civilization exists, why any such thing as Civilization can exist, and not just a bunch of farmers sleeping miserably next to their grain stores."

"But what I'd like to observe at this step is that - if the two farmers do manage to end up with the 100-100 payoff, somehow - by hypothesis, it can't be because they're Good; it has to be because they are, in some way, being Lawful."

"You expect the other purely-selfish farmer to try to steal from you anyways, though.  So you might as well steal from them first.  We could suppose that whoever carries out the theft first has a few days of plenty eating their stolen food, before the other farmer can prepare and execute a plan to steal back food."

"We could skip the part where it's a fake bear attack.  We could even skip the part where the paired thefts occur, and go directly to them spending a lot of time guarding their grain.  70-70 payoff at the end."

"But in fact, yeah, you might suspect intuitively that somehow two purely selfish farmers in this situation would manage to reason that, if they kicked off a cycle of thefts and guarding, they'd both be worse off."

"And so long as no theft had yet occurred - they would both think - maybe the two of them could, somehow, end up doing something else which is not that."

"This is the great will to do Something Else Which Is Not That, and end up Not There, which is sometimes said in dath ilan - though the truth is not known - to perhaps be the reason why Civilization exists, why any such thing as Civilization can exist, and not just a bunch of farmers sleeping miserably next to their grain stores."

"But what I'd like to observe at this step is that - if the two farmers do manage to end up with the 100-100 payoff, somehow - by hypothesis, it can't be because they're Good; it has to be because they are, in some way, being Lawful."

"You expect the other purely-selfish farmer to try to steal from you anyways, though.  So you might as well steal from them first.  We could suppose that whoever carries out the theft first has a few days of plenty eating their stolen food, before the other farmer can prepare and execute a plan to steal back food.  So if you're going to end up in that situation anyways, there's an incentive to be the first to Defect."

"We could skip the part where it's a fake bear attack.  We could even skip the part where the paired thefts occur, and go directly to them spending a lot of time guarding their grain.  70-70 payoff at the end."

"But in fact, yeah, you might suspect intuitively that somehow two purely selfish farmers in this situation would manage to reason that, if they kicked off a cycle of thefts and guarding, they'd both be worse off."

"And so long as no theft had yet occurred - they would both think - maybe the two of them could, somehow, end up doing something else which is not that."

"This is the great will to do Something Else Which Is Not That, and end up Not There, which is sometimes said in dath ilan - though the truth is not known - to perhaps be the reason why Civilization exists, why any such thing as Civilization can exist, and not just a bunch of farmers sleeping miserably next to their grain stores."

"But what I'd like to observe at this step is that - if the two farmers do manage to end up with the 100-100 payoff, somehow - by hypothesis, it can't be because they're Good; it has to be because they are, in some way, being Lawful."

"You expect the other purely-selfish farmer to try to steal from you anyways, though.  So you might as well steal from them first.  We could suppose that whoever carries out the theft first has a few days of plenty eating their stolen food, before the other farmer can prepare and execute a plan to steal back food.  So if you're going to end up in that situation anyways, there's an incentive to be the first to Defect."

"We could skip the part where it's a fake bear attack.  We could even skip the part where the paired thefts occur, and go directly to them spending a lot of time guarding their grain.  70-70 payoff at the end."

"But in fact, yeah, you might suspect intuitively that somehow two purely selfish farmers in this situation would manage to reason that, if they kicked off a cycle of thefts and guarding, they'd both be worse off."

"And so long as no theft had yet occurred - they would both think - maybe the two of them could, somehow, end up doing something else which is not that."

"This is the great will to do Something Else Which Is Not That, and end up Not There, which is sometimes said in dath ilan - though the truth is not now remembered - to perhaps be the reason why Civilization exists, why any such thing as Civilization can exist, and not just a bunch of farmers sleeping miserably next to their grain stores."

"But what I'd like to observe at this step is that - if the two farmers do manage to end up with the 100-100 payoff, somehow - by hypothesis, it can't be because they're Good; it has to be because they are, in some way, being Lawful."

"You expect the other purely-selfish farmer to try to steal from you anyways, though.  So you might as well steal from them first.  We could suppose that whoever carries out the theft first has a few days of plenty eating their stolen food, before the other farmer can prepare and execute a plan to steal back food.  So if you're going to end up in that situation anyways, there's an incentive to be the first to Defect."

"We could skip the part where it's a fake bear attack.  We could even skip the part where the paired thefts occur, and go directly to them spending a lot of time guarding their grain.  70-70 payoff at the end."

"But in fact, yeah, you might suspect intuitively that somehow two purely selfish farmers in this situation would manage to reason that, if they kicked off a cycle of thefts and guarding, they'd both be worse off."

"And so long as no theft had yet occurred - they would both think - maybe the two of them could, somehow, end up doing something else which is not that."

"This is the great will to do Something Else Which Is Not That, and end up Not There, which is sometimes said in dath ilan - though the truth is not now remembered - to perhaps be the reason why Civilization exists, why any such thing as Civilization now exists, and not just a bunch of farmers sleeping miserably next to their grain stores."

"But what I'd like to observe at this step is that - if the two farmers do manage to end up with the 100-100 payoff, somehow - by hypothesis, it can't be because they're Good; it has to be because they are, in some way, being Lawful."