"There's countably infinite worlds, not uncountable ones - there's as many worlds as there are counting numbers, not as many as there are possible infinite sets of counting numbers.  You can only get ratios between the reality-weight of worlds if they're countable, so only those can be real.  Any time a world is divided more finely than that, only the parts that - I can't actually say this in Taldane, sorry."*

"And nice try, but we have ways to banish the 'anthropics' out of the conversation.  We can bet on a mathematical fact that neither of us know and seems to have the right random properties, like whether the remainder of 1001 divided by 17 is more than 6, say, which should give us a probability pretty close to 6/17.  I could truthspell myself and promise you that I hadn't secretly calculated the result in advance."

"There's no other worlds where that fact will be different.  So why do I need to value that bet on apple at 6/17ths the value of an apple?"

(*) Realityfluid can be spread out over continuous distributions, but only chunks of those distributions large enough to integrate up to finite measures have people finding themselves inside.  People themselves are not so finely divisible, in regards to finding yourself to be one of them.  If you tried to make a continuity of different people in order to have an uncountable population of distinct people, sufficiently close parts of that continuity that they couldn't tell themselves apart would add realityweight from the perspective of whether you find yourself to be one of them, and so again you'd find yourself as something whose realityweight sums up to a finite fraction of everything there is.  This is why nobody ever finds themselves to be an entity with an actually-infinite number of internally-distinguishable distinct parts.

"There's countably infinite worlds, not uncountable ones - there's as many worlds as there are counting numbers, not as many as there are possible infinite sets of counting numbers.  You can only get ratios between the reality-weight of worlds if they're countable, so only those can be real.  Any time a world is divided more finely than that, only the parts that - I can't actually say this in Taldane, sorry."*

"And nice try, but we have ways to banish the 'anthropics' out of the conversation.  We can bet on a mathematical fact that neither of us know and seems to have the right random properties, like whether the remainder of 1001 divided by 17 is more than 6, say, which should give us a probability pretty close to 6/17.  I could truthspell myself and promise you that I hadn't secretly calculated the result in advance."

"There's no other worlds where that fact will be different.  So why do I need to value that bet of an apple at 6/17ths the value of an apple?"

(*) Realityfluid can be spread out over continuous distributions, but only chunks of those distributions large enough to integrate up to finite measures have people finding themselves inside.  People themselves are not so finely divisible, in regards to finding yourself to be one of them.  If you tried to make a continuity of different people in order to have an uncountable population of distinct people, sufficiently close parts of that continuity that they couldn't tell themselves apart would add realityweight from the perspective of whether you find yourself to be one of them, and so again you'd find yourself as something whose realityweight sums up to a finite fraction of everything there is.  This is why nobody ever finds themselves to be an entity with an actually-infinite number of internally-distinguishable distinct parts.

"There's countably infinite worlds, not uncountable ones - there's as many worlds as there are counting numbers, not as many as there are possible infinite sets of counting numbers.  You can only get ratios between the reality-weight of worlds if they're countable, so only those can be real.  Any time a world is divided more finely than that, only the parts that - I can't actually say this in Taldane, sorry."*

"And nice try, but we have ways to banish the 'anthropics' out of the conversation.  We can bet on a mathematical fact that neither of us know and seems to have the right random properties, like whether the remainder of 1001 divided by 17 is more than 6, say, which should give us a probability pretty close to 6/17.  I could truthspell myself and promise you that I hadn't secretly calculated the result in advance."

"There's no other worlds where that fact will be different.  So why do I need to value that bet of an apple at 6/17ths the value of an apple?"

(*) Realityfluid can be spread out over continuous distributions, but only chunks of those distributions large enough to integrate up to finite measures have people finding themselves inside.  People themselves are not so finely divisible, in regards to finding yourself to be one of them.  If you tried to make a continuity of different people in order to have an uncountable population of distinct people, sufficiently close parts of that continuity that they couldn't tell themselves apart would add realityweight from the perspective of whether you find yourself to be one of them, and so again you'd find yourself as something whose realityweight sums up to a finite fraction of everything there is.  This is why nobody ever finds themselves to be an entity with an actually-infinite number of introspectively-distinguishable distinct parts.

"There's countably infinite worlds, not uncountable ones - there's as many worlds as there are counting numbers, not as many as there are possible infinite sets of counting numbers.  You can only get ratios between the reality-weight of worlds if they're countable, so only those can be real.  Any time a world is divided more finely than that, only the parts that - I can't actually say this in Taldane, sorry."*

"And nice try, but we have ways to banish the 'anthropics' out of the conversation.  We can bet on a mathematical fact that neither of us know and seems to have the right random properties, like whether the remainder of 1001 divided by 17 is greater than or equal to 6, say, which should give us a probability pretty close to 6/17.  I could truthspell myself and promise you that I hadn't secretly calculated the result in advance."

"There's no other worlds where that fact will be different.  So why do I need to value that bet of an apple at 6/17ths the value of an apple?"

(*) Realityfluid can be spread out over continuous distributions, but only chunks of those distributions large enough to integrate up to finite measures have people finding themselves inside.  People themselves are not so finely divisible, in regards to finding yourself to be one of them.  If you tried to make a continuity of different people in order to have an uncountable population of distinct people, sufficiently close parts of that continuity that they couldn't tell themselves apart would add realityweight from the perspective of whether you find yourself to be one of them, and so again you'd find yourself as something whose realityweight sums up to a finite fraction of everything there is.  This is why nobody ever finds themselves to be an entity with an actually-infinite number of introspectively-distinguishable distinct parts.

"There's countably infinite worlds, not uncountable ones - there's as many worlds as there are counting numbers, not as many as there are possible infinite sets of counting numbers.  You can only get ratios between the reality-weight of worlds if they're countable, so only those can be real.  Any time a world is divided more finely than that, only the parts that - I can't actually say this in Taldane, sorry."*

"And nice try, but we have ways to banish the 'anthropics' out of the conversation.  We can bet on a mathematical fact that neither of us know and seems to have the right random properties, like whether the remainder of 1001 divided by 17 is less than 6, say, which should give us a probability pretty close to 6/17.  I could truthspell myself and promise you that I hadn't secretly calculated the result in advance."

"There's no other worlds where that fact will be different.  So why do I need to value that bet of an apple at 6/17ths the value of an apple?"

(*) Realityfluid can be spread out over continuous distributions, but only chunks of those distributions large enough to integrate up to finite measures have people finding themselves inside.  People themselves are not so finely divisible, in regards to finding yourself to be one of them.  If you tried to make a continuity of different people in order to have an uncountable population of distinct people, sufficiently close parts of that continuity that they couldn't tell themselves apart would add realityweight from the perspective of whether you find yourself to be one of them, and so again you'd find yourself as something whose realityweight sums up to a finite fraction of everything there is.  This is why nobody ever finds themselves to be an entity with an actually-infinite number of introspectively-distinguishable distinct parts.