Anyways!  In terms of Law, this whole lecture has now gotten far ahead of itself!  The true Law does not assume that there is some mystical stuff called 'money' floating around, in which everything can already be valued.  The Law begins from people wanting things; a notion of money comes later, beneath the Law and after the Law, not before it and above it.

Going back to where they left off on Law: this classroom has now seen, at this point, that things you want, which by an act of choice or expenditure of time you can swap or trade, need to be consistently orderable among themselves in order to avoid having time or money pumped out of you.  Even indifferences - in the sense of letting other people swap things for you, not just it not being worth the effort of making a trade - must be coherent within the ordering, to avoid this.

They've seen a sort of parlour trick for getting dath ilani children or Golarion adults to violate this consistent ordering, just by way of showing that it's not a trivial requirement.  (And hinting at how there must be vastly more terrifying things that high-ranking Keepers can do if not otherwise restrained by ethics, but that's not the main point.)

To take the next step beyond ordering, consider things that are divisible, fungible, that have quantities over them, and not just unique individual identities.  Let's consider apples, bananas, cherries, and suppose - temporarily - that the relative intensity of your desire for these fruits does not change depending on how many you already have.  (Maybe you're planning to feed those fruits to a large hungry crowd so you actually care more about food-energy-value than a tasty meal with variety, say.)  Suppose, for now, that every fruit is identical to every other fruit of that kind, at least so far as your wanting of them is concerned.  Suppose also that you would, for each of these kinds of fruits, prefer to have more rather than less, everything else be equal.

It'd be pretty odd if you valued a cherry equally with a whole banana.  It should take at least two cherries to be worth a banana, right?  Probably more.  If somebody offers to trade you a banana for two cherries, you should probably accept.

But that's not Law; there could be such a thing as a person who would rather have one cherry than two bananas.

What can we say, in this situation, about the patterns of offered trades that you will accept or reject - what property must such patterns have to avoid some dreadful thing happening to you, and what indeed is that misfortune?

Anyways!  In terms of Law, this whole lecture has now gotten far ahead of itself!  The true Law does not assume that there is some mystical stuff called 'money' floating around, in which everything can already be valued.  The Law begins from people wanting things; a notion of money comes later, beneath the Law and after the Law, not before it and above it.

Going back to where they left off on Law: this classroom has now seen, at this point, that things you want, which by an act of choice or expenditure of time you can swap or trade, need to be consistently orderable among themselves in order to avoid having time or money pumped out of you.  Even indifferences - in the sense of letting other people swap things for you, not just it not being worth the effort of making a trade - must be coherent within the ordering, to avoid this.

They've seen a sort of parlour trick for getting dath ilani children or Golarion adults to violate this consistent ordering, just by way of showing that it's not a trivial requirement.  (And hinting at how there must be vastly more terrifying things that high-ranking Keepers can do if not otherwise restrained by ethics, but that's not the main point.)

To take the next step beyond ordering, consider things that are divisible, fungible, that have quantities over them, and not just unique individual identities.  Let's consider apples, bananas, cherries, and suppose - temporarily - that the relative intensity of your desire for these fruits does not change depending on how many you already have.  (Maybe you're planning to feed those fruits to a large hungry crowd so you actually care more about food-energy-value than a tasty meal with variety, say.)  Suppose, for now, that every fruit is identical to every other fruit of that kind, at least so far as your wanting of them is concerned.  Suppose also that you would, for each of these kinds of fruits, prefer to have more rather than less, everything else be equal.

It'd be pretty odd if you valued a cherry equally with a whole banana.  It should take at least two cherries to be worth a banana, right?  Probably more.  If somebody offers to trade you a banana for two cherries, you should probably accept.

But that's not Law; there could be such a thing as a person who would rather have one cherry than two bananas.

What can we say, in this situation, about the patterns of offered trades that you will accept or reject - what property must your trading-rule have to avoid some dreadful thing happening to you, and what indeed is that misfortune?

Anyways!  In terms of Law, this whole lecture has now gotten far ahead of itself!  The true Law does not assume that there is some mystical stuff called 'money' floating around, in which everything can already be valued.  The Law begins from people wanting things; a notion of money comes later, beneath the Law and after the Law, not before it and above it.

Going back to where they left off on Law: this classroom has now seen, at this point, that things you want, which by an act of choice or expenditure of time you can swap or trade, need to be consistently orderable among themselves in order to avoid having time or money pumped out of you.  Even indifferences - in the sense of letting other people swap things for you, not just it not being worth the effort of making a trade - must be coherent within the ordering, to avoid this.

They've seen a sort of parlour trick for getting dath ilani children or Golarion adults to violate this consistent ordering, just by way of showing that it's not a trivial requirement.  (And hinting at how there must be vastly more terrifying things that high-ranking Keepers can do if not otherwise restrained by ethics, but that's not the main point.)

To take the next step beyond ordering, consider things that are divisible, fungible, that have quantities over them, and not just unique individual identities.  Let's consider apples, bananas, cherries, and suppose - temporarily - that the relative intensity of your desire for these fruits does not change depending on how many you already have.  (Maybe you're planning to feed those fruits to a large hungry crowd so you actually care more about food-energy-value than a tasty meal with variety, say.)  Suppose, for now, that every fruit is identical to every other fruit of that kind.  Suppose also that you would, for each of these kinds of fruits, prefer to have more rather than less, everything else be equal.

It'd be pretty odd if you valued a cherry equally with a whole banana.  It should take at least two cherries to be worth a banana, right?  Probably more.  If somebody offers to trade you a banana for two cherries, you should probably accept.

But that's not Law; there could be such a thing as a person who would rather have one cherry than two bananas.

What can we say, in this situation, about the patterns of offered trades that you will accept or reject - what property must your trading-rule have to avoid some dreadful thing happening to you, and what indeed is that misfortune?

Anyways!  In terms of Law, this whole lecture has now gotten far ahead of itself!  The true Law does not assume that there is some mystical stuff called 'money' floating around, in which everything can already be valued.  The Law begins from people wanting things; a notion of money comes later, beneath the Law and after the Law, not before it and above it.

Going back to where they left off on Law: this classroom has now seen, at this point, that things you want, which by an act of choice or expenditure of time you can swap or trade, need to be consistently orderable among themselves in order to avoid having time or money pumped out of you.  Even indifferences - in the sense of letting other people swap things for you, not just it not being worth the effort of making a trade - must be coherent within the ordering, to avoid this.

They've seen a simple trick for getting dath ilani children or Golarion adults to violate this consistent ordering, just by way of showing that it's not a trivial requirement.  (And hinting at how there must be vastly more terrifying things that high-ranking Keepers can do if not otherwise restrained by ethics, but that's not the main point.)

To take the next step beyond ordering, consider things that are divisible, fungible, that have quantities over them, and not just unique individual identities.  Let's consider apples, bananas, cherries, and suppose - temporarily - that the relative intensity of your desire for these fruits does not change depending on how many you already have.  (Maybe you're planning to feed those fruits to a large hungry crowd so you actually care more about food-energy-value than a tasty meal with variety, say.)  Suppose, for now, that every fruit is identical to every other fruit of that kind.  Suppose also that you would, for each of these kinds of fruits, prefer to have more rather than less, everything else be equal.

It'd be pretty odd if you valued a cherry equally with a whole banana.  It should take at least two cherries to be worth a banana, right?  Probably more.  If somebody offers to trade you a banana for two cherries, you should probably accept.

But that's not Law; there could be such a thing as a person who would rather have one cherry than two bananas.

What can we say, in this situation, about the patterns of offered trades that you will accept or reject - what property must your trading-rule have to avoid some dreadful thing happening to you, and what indeed is that misfortune?

Anyways!  In terms of Law, this whole lecture has now gotten far ahead of itself!  The true Law does not assume that there is some mystical stuff called 'money' floating around, in which everything can already be valued.  The Law begins from people wanting things; a notion of money comes later, beneath the Law and after the Law, not before it and above it.

Going back to where they left off on Law: this classroom has now seen, at this point, that things you want, which by an act of choice or expenditure of time you can swap or trade, need to be consistently orderable among themselves in order to avoid having time or money pumped out of you.  Even indifferences - in the sense of letting other people swap things for you, not just it not being worth the effort of making a trade - must be coherent within the ordering, to avoid this.

They've seen a simple trick for getting dath ilani children or Golarion adults to violate this consistent ordering, just by way of showing that it's not a trivial requirement.  (And hinting at how there must be vastly more terrifying things that high-ranking Keepers can do if not otherwise restrained by ethics, but that's not the main point.)

To take the next step beyond ordering, consider things that are divisible, fungible; things that have quantities over them, and not just unique individual identities.  Let's consider apples, bananas, cherries, and suppose - temporarily - that the relative intensity of your desire for these fruits does not change depending on how many you already have.  (Maybe you're planning to feed those fruits to a large hungry crowd so you actually care more about food-energy-value than a tasty meal with variety, say.)  Suppose, for now, that every fruit is identical to every other fruit of that kind.  Suppose also that you would, for each of these kinds of fruits, prefer to have more rather than less, everything else be equal.

It'd be pretty odd if you valued a cherry equally with a whole banana.  It should take at least two cherries to be worth a banana, right?  Probably more.  If somebody offers to trade you a banana for two cherries, you should probably accept.

But that's not Law; there could be such a thing as a person who would rather have one cherry than two bananas.

What can we say, in this situation, about the patterns of offered trades that you will accept or reject - what property must your trading-rule have to avoid some dreadful thing happening to you, and what indeed is that misfortune?