Well someone obviously came to a fast decision about whether she wants to be his nearly-ace harem member.  Or maybe, only about whether she might want to be; but sufficient to start flirting about it, at any rate.

"But yes, you aren't particularly allowed to reallocate the probability of observations after you observe them.  One way of thinking about it:  Probability of Carissa-Ione-Pilar given Conspiracy is meant to capture the probability that Keltham would assign if you asked him beforehand about what was likely to happen at lunch.  And all of the possible mutually-exclusive observations you can consider explicitly, need probabilities summing to at most 1.  The probability that exactly Carissa-Ione-Pilar go off at lunch, that Carissa-Ione-Pilar-Asmodia go off at lunch, and that nobody goes off at lunch, must sum to at most 1.  Realistically less than 1 because, say, I should've assigned some probability that, for example, just Ione and Pilar would run off, or that the whole lunch would be disrupted by a Nidal attack."

"This is why, especially at your stage of learning, we'd consider it a much more believable probability estimate, if you say in advance what will probably happen, compared to if you look back afterwards and come up with a reason why that event was clearly very predictable."

"If I'd thought in advance about the probabilities that Ostenso wizard academy would have any available books listing cleric spells, I could have considered the possibility that it would, and that it wouldn't, in an Ordinary world, and then considered the probability that Governance would need to stall me, in a Conspiracy world, versus having appropriately doctored books already made up.  If I'd done that in advance, I couldn't be influenced, either when thinking about the Ordinary world, or the Conspiracy world, by wanting to make a world give the 'correct' result, because I wouldn't know, in advance, which result I would observe."

"Since I didn't think that quickly, I had to go back and make up the probabilities afterwards.  And then there's a risk that, for example, maybe you don't want to believe in the Conspiracy world, so once you know that the real result is no-book, you're tempted to twist things around inside your mind and come up with a story for how the Conspiracy world would definitely have finished making up a doctored book of cleric spells by then, because they would anticipate my question and not want me to be suspicious about an absent book."

"If I make my prediction in advance, my mind will be less tempted to do that because I won't know that an absent book is the particular outcome that the Conspiracy world needs to dispredict in order for me to end up not believing that unpleasant thing."

"Dath ilani do have any skills for fighting that, for being able to come up with reasonable probabilities even after the fact; but those skills are difficult even for average dath ilani, which you frankly are not at this point.  You can ask two groups of medium-rank Keepers for their conditional probabilities, one group before and one group after they find out the real answer on some problem, and there'll be no significant systematic difference between the groups.  Because Keepers, that's why."

"You would not find zero detectable difference between groups of dath ilani with around my age and intelligence levels, asked to say the likelihood that there'd be no book of cleric spells available, in the Conspiracy world, and in the Ordinary world, both before and after they actually got that result."

"Everyone gets trained in skills that partially protect against assigning-different-conditional-probabilities-to-outcomes-once-you-know-what-the-outcomes-are, but that's, like, diminishing the distortion by a factor of five, not driving the distortion down to undetectable levels.  That's the realm of, I would expect, sufficiently old devils, or gods, but definitely Keepers rank four and up."

Well someone obviously came to a fast decision about whether she wants to be his nearly-ace harem member.  Or maybe, only about whether she might want to be; but sufficient to start flirting about it, at any rate.

"But yes, you aren't particularly allowed to reallocate the probability of observations after you observe them.  One way of thinking about it:  Probability of Carissa-Ione-Pilar given Conspiracy is meant to capture the probability that Keltham would assign if you asked him beforehand about what was likely to happen at lunch.  And all of the possible mutually-exclusive observations you can consider explicitly, need probabilities summing to at most 1.  The probability that exactly Carissa-Ione-Pilar go off at lunch, that Carissa-Ione-Pilar-Asmodia go off at lunch, and that nobody goes off at lunch, must sum to at most 1.  Realistically less than 1 because, say, I should've assigned some probability that, for example, just Ione and Pilar would run off, or that the whole lunch would be disrupted by a Nidal attack."

"This is why, especially at your stage of learning, we'd consider it a much more believable probability estimate, if you say in advance what will probably happen, compared to if you look back afterwards and come up with a reason why that event was clearly very predictable."

"If I'd thought in advance about the probabilities that Ostenso wizard academy would have any available books listing cleric spells, I could have considered the possibility that it would, and that it wouldn't, in an Ordinary world, and then considered the probability that Governance would need to stall me, in a Conspiracy world, versus having appropriately doctored books already made up.  If I'd done that in advance, I couldn't be influenced, either when thinking about the Ordinary world, or the Conspiracy world, by wanting to make a world give the 'correct' result, because I wouldn't know, in advance, which result I would observe."

"Since I didn't think that quickly, I had to go back and make up the probabilities afterwards.  And then there's a risk that, for example, maybe you don't want to believe in the Conspiracy world, so once you know that the real result is no-book, you're tempted to twist things around inside your mind and come up with a story for how the Conspiracy world would definitely have finished making up a doctored book of cleric spells by then, because they would anticipate my question and not want me to be suspicious about an absent book."

"If I make my prediction in advance, my mind will be less tempted to do that because I won't know that an absent book is the particular outcome that the Conspiracy world needs to dispredict in order for me to end up not believing that unpleasant thing."

"Dath ilani do have any skills for fighting that, for being able to come up with reasonable probabilities even after the fact; but those skills are difficult even for average dath ilani, which you frankly are not at this point.  You can ask two groups of medium-rank Keepers for their conditional probabilities, one group before and one group after they find out the real answer on some problem, and there'll be no significant systematic difference between the groups.  Because Keepers, that's why.  You would not find zero detectable difference between groups of dath ilani with around my age and intelligence levels, asked to say the likelihood that there'd be no book of cleric spells available, in the Conspiracy world, and in the Ordinary world, both before and after they actually got that result."

"Everyone gets trained in skills that partially protect against assigning-different-conditional-probabilities-to-outcomes-once-you-know-what-the-outcomes-are, but that's, like, diminishing the distortion by a factor of five, not driving the distortion down to undetectable levels.  That's the realm of, I would expect, sufficiently old devils, or gods, but definitely Keepers rank four and up."

Well someone obviously came to a fast decision about whether she wants to be his nearly-ace harem member.  Or maybe, only about whether she might want to be; but sufficient to start flirting about it, at any rate.

"But yes, you aren't particularly allowed to reallocate the probability of observations after you observe them.  One way of thinking about it:  Probability of Carissa-Ione-Pilar given Conspiracy is meant to capture the probability that Keltham would assign if you asked him beforehand about what was likely to happen at lunch.  And all of the possible mutually-exclusive observations you can consider explicitly, need probabilities summing to at most 1.  The probability that exactly Carissa-Ione-Pilar go off at lunch, that Carissa-Ione-Pilar-Asmodia go off at lunch, and that nobody goes off at lunch, must sum to at most 1.  Realistically less than 1 because, say, I should've assigned some probability that, for example, just Ione and Pilar would run off, or that the whole lunch would be disrupted by a Nidal attack."

"This is why, especially at your stage of learning, we'd consider it a much more believable probability estimate, if you say in advance what will probably happen, compared to if you look back afterwards and come up with a reason why that event was clearly very predictable."

"If I'd thought in advance about the probabilities that Ostenso wizard academy would have any available books listing cleric spells, I could have considered the possibility that it would, and that it wouldn't, in an Ordinary world, and then considered the probability that Governance would need to stall me, in a Conspiracy world, versus having appropriately doctored books already made up.  If I'd done that in advance, I couldn't be influenced, either when thinking about the Ordinary world, or the Conspiracy world, by wanting to make a world give the 'correct' result, because I wouldn't know, in advance, which result I would observe."

"Since I didn't think that quickly, I had to go back and make up the probabilities afterwards.  And then there's a risk that, for example, maybe you don't want to believe in the Conspiracy world, so once you know that the real result is no-book, you're tempted to twist things around inside your mind and come up with a story for how the Conspiracy world would definitely have finished making up a doctored book of cleric spells by then, because they would anticipate my question and not want me to be suspicious about an absent book."

"If I make my prediction in advance, my mind will be less tempted to do that because I won't know that an absent book is the particular outcome that the Conspiracy world needs to dispredict in order for me to end up not believing that unpleasant thing."

"Dath ilani do have any skills for fighting that, for being able to come up with reasonable probabilities even after the fact; but those skills are difficult even for average dath ilani, which you frankly are not at this point.  You can ask two groups of medium-rank Keepers for their conditional probabilities, one group before and one group after they find out the real answer on some problem, and there'll be no significant systematic difference between the groups.  Because Keepers, that's why.  You would not find zero detectable difference between groups of dath ilani with around my age and intelligence levels, asked to say the likelihood that there'd be no book of cleric spells available, in the Conspiracy world, and in the Ordinary world, both before and after they actually got that result."

"Everyone gets trained in skills that partially protect against assigning-different-conditional-probabilities-to-outcomes-once-you-know-what-the-outcomes-are, but that's, like, diminishing the distortion by a factor of five, not driving the distortion down to undetectable levels.  That's the realm of, I would expect, sufficiently old devils, or gods - but definitely, it is known, Keepers rank four and up."

"Because, I would assume, among other things, they practice really really hard until they stop doing it wrong, and not everybody has the time for that."

Well someone obviously came to a fast decision about whether she wants to be his nearly-ace harem member.  Or maybe, only about whether she might want to be; but sufficient to start flirting about it, at any rate.

"But yes, you aren't particularly allowed to reallocate the probability of observations after you observe them.  One way of thinking about it:  Probability of Carissa-Ione-Pilar given Conspiracy is meant to capture the probability that Keltham would assign if you asked him beforehand about what was likely to happen at lunch.  And all of the possible mutually-exclusive observations you can consider explicitly, need probabilities summing to at most 1.  The probability that exactly Carissa-Ione-Pilar go off at lunch, that Carissa-Ione-Pilar-Asmodia go off at lunch, and that nobody goes off at lunch, must sum to at most 1.  Realistically less than 1 because, say, I should've assigned some probability that, for example, just Ione and Pilar would run off, or that the whole lunch would be disrupted by a Nidal attack."

"This is why, especially at your stage of learning, we'd consider it a much more believable probability estimate, if you say in advance what will probably happen, compared to if you look back afterwards and come up with a reason why that event was clearly very predictable."

"If I'd thought in advance about the probabilities that Ostenso wizard academy would have any available books listing cleric spells, I could have considered the possibility that it would, and that it wouldn't, in an Ordinary world, and then considered the probability that Governance would need to stall me, in a Conspiracy world, versus having appropriately doctored books already made up.  If I'd done that in advance, I couldn't be influenced, either when thinking about the Ordinary world, or the Conspiracy world, by wanting to make a world give the 'correct' result, because I wouldn't know, in advance, which result I would observe."

"Since I didn't think that quickly, I had to go back and make up the probabilities afterwards.  And then there's a risk that, for example, maybe you don't want to believe in the Conspiracy world, so once you know that the real result is no-book, you're tempted to twist things around inside your mind and come up with a story for how the Conspiracy world would definitely have finished making up a doctored book of cleric spells by then, because they would anticipate my question and not want me to be suspicious about an absent book."

"If I make my prediction in advance, my mind will be less tempted to do that because I won't know that an absent book is the particular outcome that the Conspiracy world needs to dispredict in order for me to end up not believing that unpleasant thing."

"Dath ilani do have any skills for fighting that, for being able to come up with reasonable probabilities even after the fact; but those skills are difficult even for average dath ilani, which you frankly are not at this point.  You can ask two groups of medium-rank Keepers for their conditional probabilities, one group before and one group after they find out the real answer on some problem, and there'll be no significant systematic difference between the groups.  Because Keepers, that's why.  You would not find zero detectable difference between groups of dath ilani with around my age and intelligence levels, asked to say the likelihood that there'd be no book of cleric spells available, in the Conspiracy world, and in the Ordinary world, both before and after they actually got that result."

"Everyone gets trained in skills that partially protect against assigning-different-conditional-probabilities-to-outcomes-once-you-know-what-the-outcomes-are, but that's, like, diminishing the distortion by a factor of five, not driving the distortion down to undetectable levels.  That's the realm of, I would expect, sufficiently old devils, or gods - but definitely, it is known, Keepers rank four and up."

"Because - I would assume, and among other reasons - they practice really really hard until they stop doing it wrong, and not everybody has the time for that."

Well someone obviously came to a fast decision about whether she wants to be his nearly-ace harem member.  Or maybe, only about whether she might want to be; but sufficient to start flirting about it, at any rate.

"But yes, you aren't particularly allowed to reallocate the probability of observations after you observe them.  One way of thinking about it:  Probability of Carissa-Ione-Pilar given Conspiracy is meant to capture the probability that Keltham would assign if you asked him beforehand about what was likely to happen at lunch.  And all of the possible mutually-exclusive observations you can consider explicitly, need probabilities summing to at most 1.  The probability that exactly Carissa-Ione-Pilar go off at lunch, that Carissa-Ione-Pilar-Asmodia go off at lunch, and that nobody goes off at lunch, must sum to at most 1.  Realistically less than 1 because, say, I should've assigned some probability that, for example, just Ione and Pilar would run off, or that the whole lunch would be disrupted by a Nidal attack."

"This is why, especially at your stage of learning, we'd consider it a much more believable probability estimate, if you say in advance what will probably happen, compared to if you look back afterwards and come up with a reason why that event was clearly very predictable."

"If I'd thought in advance about the probabilities that Ostenso wizard academy would have any available books listing cleric spells, I could have considered the possibility that it would, and that it wouldn't, in an Ordinary world, and then considered the probability that Governance would need to stall me, in a Conspiracy world, versus having appropriately doctored books already made up.  If I'd done that in advance, I couldn't be influenced, either when thinking about the Ordinary world, or the Conspiracy world, by wanting to make a world give the 'correct' result, because I wouldn't know, in advance, which result I would observe."

"Since I didn't think that quickly, I had to go back and make up the probabilities afterwards.  And then there's a risk that, for example, maybe you don't want to believe in the Conspiracy world, so once you know that the real result is no-book, you're tempted to twist things around inside your mind and come up with a story for how the Conspiracy world would definitely have finished making up a doctored book of cleric spells by then, because they would anticipate my question and not want me to be suspicious about an absent book."

"If I make my prediction in advance, my mind will be less tempted to do that because I won't know that an absent book is the particular outcome that the Conspiracy world needs to dispredict in order for me to end up not believing that unpleasant thing."

"Dath ilani do have any skills for fighting that, for being able to come up with reasonable probabilities even after the fact; but those skills are difficult even for average dath ilani, which you frankly are not at this point.  You can ask two groups of medium-rank Keepers for their conditional probabilities, one group before and one group after they find out the real answer on some problem, and there'll be no significant systematic difference between the groups.  Because Keepers, that's why.  You would not find zero detectable difference between groups of dath ilani with around my age and intelligence levels, asked to say the likelihood that there'd be no book of cleric spells available, in the Conspiracy world, and in the Ordinary world, both before and after they actually got that result."

"Everyone gets trained in skills that partially protect against assigning-different-conditional-probabilities-to-outcomes-once-you-know-what-the-outcomes-are, but that's, like, diminishing the distortion by a factor of five, not driving the distortion down to undetectable levels.  That's the realm of, I would expect, sufficiently old devils, or gods - but definitely, it is known, Keepers rank four and up."

"Because - I would assume, and among other reasons - they practice really really hard until they stop doing it wrong, and not everybody has the time for that."

"So even I try to make my predictions in advance, if I remember and I'm not too lazy and it's important; and you at this point should strongly, though not invincibly, question and distrust any probabilities for observations that you make up after the fact."

Well someone obviously came to a fast decision about whether she wants to be his nearly-ace harem member.  Or maybe, only about whether she might want to be; but sufficient to start flirting about it, at any rate.

"But yes, you aren't particularly allowed to reallocate the probability of observations after you observe them.  One way of thinking about it:  Probability of Carissa-Ione-Pilar given Conspiracy is meant to capture the probability that Keltham would assign if you asked him beforehand about what was likely to happen at lunch.  And all of the possible mutually-exclusive observations you can consider explicitly, need probabilities summing to at most 1.  The probability that exactly Carissa-Ione-Pilar go off at lunch, that Carissa-Ione-Pilar-Asmodia go off at lunch, and that nobody goes off at lunch, must sum to at most 1.  Realistically less than 1 because, say, I should've assigned some probability that, for example, just Ione and Pilar would run off, or that the whole lunch would be disrupted by a Nidal attack."

"This is why, especially at your stage of learning, we'd consider it a much more believable probability estimate, if you say in advance what will probably happen, compared to if you look back afterwards and come up with a reason why that event was clearly very predictable."

"If I'd thought in advance about the probabilities that Ostenso wizard academy would have any available books listing cleric spells, I could have considered the possibility that it would, and that it wouldn't, in an Ordinary world, and then considered the probability that Governance would need to stall me, in a Conspiracy world, versus having appropriately doctored books already made up.  If I'd done that in advance, I couldn't be influenced, either when thinking about the Ordinary world, or the Conspiracy world, by wanting to make a world give the 'correct' result, because I wouldn't know, in advance, which result I would observe."

"Since I didn't think that quickly, I had to go back and make up the probabilities afterwards.  And then there's a risk that, for example, maybe you don't want to believe in the Conspiracy world, so once you know that the real result is no-book, you're tempted to twist things around inside your mind and come up with a story for how the Conspiracy world would definitely have finished making up a doctored book of cleric spells by then, because they would anticipate my question and not want me to be suspicious about an absent book."

"If I make my prediction in advance, my mind will be less tempted to do that because I won't know that an absent book is the particular outcome that the Conspiracy world needs to dispredict in order for me to end up not believing that unpleasant thing."

"Dath ilani do have any skills for fighting that, for being able to come up with reasonable probabilities even after the fact; but those skills are difficult even for average dath ilani, which you frankly are not at this point.  You can ask two groups of medium-rank Keepers for their conditional probabilities, one group before and one group after they find out the real answer on some problem, and there'll be no significant systematic difference between the groups.  Because Keepers, that's why.  You would not find zero detectable difference between groups of dath ilani with around my age and intelligence levels, asked to say the likelihood that there'd be no book of cleric spells available, in the Conspiracy world, and in the Ordinary world, both before and after they actually got that result."

"Everyone gets trained in skills that partially protect against assigning-different-conditional-probabilities-to-outcomes-once-you-know-what-the-outcomes-are, but that's, like, diminishing the distortion by a factor of five, not driving the distortion down to undetectable levels.  That's the realm of, I would expect, sufficiently old devils, or gods - but definitely, it is known, Keepers rank four and up."

"Because - I would assume, and among other reasons - they practice really really hard until they stop doing it wrong, and not everybody has the time for that."

"So even I try to make my predictions in advance, if I remember and I'm not too lazy and it's important; and you at this point should strongly, though not invincibly, question and distrust any probabilities for observations that you make up after seeing the answer."

Well someone obviously came to a fast decision about whether she wants to be his nearly-ace harem member.  Or maybe, only about whether she might want to be; but sufficient to start flirting about it, at any rate.

"But yes, you aren't particularly allowed to reallocate the probability of observations after you observe them.  One way of thinking about it:  Probability of Carissa-Ione-Pilar given Conspiracy is meant to capture the probability that Keltham would assign if you asked him beforehand about what was likely to happen at lunch.  And all of the possible mutually-exclusive observations you can consider explicitly, need probabilities summing to at most 1.  The probability that exactly Carissa-Ione-Pilar go off at lunch, that Carissa-Ione-Pilar-Asmodia go off at lunch, and that nobody goes off at lunch, must sum to at most 1.  Realistically less than 1 because, say, I should've assigned some probability that, for example, just Ione and Pilar would run off, or that the whole lunch would be disrupted by a Nidal attack."

"This is why, especially at your stage of learning, we'd consider it a much more believable probability estimate, if you say in advance what will probably happen, compared to if you look back afterwards and come up with a reason why that event was clearly very predictable."

"If I'd thought in advance about the probabilities that Ostenso wizard academy would have any available books listing cleric spells, I could have considered the possibility that it would, and that it wouldn't, in an Ordinary world, and then considered the probability that Governance would need to stall me, in a Conspiracy world, versus having appropriately doctored books already made up.  If I'd done that in advance, I couldn't be influenced, either when thinking about the Ordinary world, or the Conspiracy world, by wanting to make a world give the 'correct' result, because I wouldn't know, in advance, which result I would observe."

"Since I didn't think that quickly, I had to go back and make up the probabilities afterwards.  And then there's a risk that, for example, maybe you don't want to believe in the Conspiracy world, so once you know that the real result is no-book, you're tempted to twist things around inside your mind and come up with a story for how the Conspiracy world would definitely have finished making up a doctored book of cleric spells by then, because they would anticipate my question and not want me to be suspicious about an absent book."

"If I make my prediction in advance, my mind will be less tempted to do that because I won't know that an absent book is the particular outcome that the Conspiracy world needs to dispredict in order for me to end up not believing that unpleasant thing."

"Dath ilani do have any skills for fighting that, for being able to come up with reasonable probabilities even after the fact; but those skills are difficult even for average dath ilani, which you frankly are not at this point.  You can ask two groups of medium-rank Keepers for their conditional probabilities, one group before and one group after they find out the real answer on some problem, and there'll be no significant systematic difference between the groups.  Because Keepers, that's why.  You would not find zero detectable difference between groups of dath ilani with around my age and intelligence levels, asked to say the likelihood that there'd be no book of cleric spells available, in the Conspiracy world, and in the Ordinary world, both before and after they actually got that result."

"Everyone gets trained in skills that partially protect against assigning-different-conditional-probabilities-to-outcomes-once-you-know-what-the-outcomes-are, but that's, like, diminishing the distortion by a factor of five, not driving the distortion down to undetectable levels.  That's the realm of, I would expect, sufficiently old devils, or gods - but definitely, it is known, Keepers rank four and up."

"Because - I would assume, and among other reasons - they practice really really hard until they stop doing it wrong, and not everybody has the time for that."

"So even I try to make my predictions in advance, if I remember and I'm not too lazy and it's important.  So you at this point should strongly, though not invincibly, question and distrust any probabilities for observations that you make up after seeing the answer."