"Once you've arrived at a notion of a 'fair price' in some one-time trading situation where the seller sets a price and the buyer decides whether to accept, the seller doesn't have an incentive to say the fair price is higher than that; the buyer will accept with a lower probability that cancels out some of the seller's expected gains from trade.  The buyer also doesn't have an incentive to claim the fair price is lower than they think it really is.  The seller won't actually adjust their price, if they think a lower price is unfair, and the buyer will have to follow through by accepting with a lower probability, which destroys a big chunk of their own expected gains from trade, and doesn't actually get them a different price even if the random number says to accept."

"The initial notion of a fair price has to come from somewhere - from the part of yourself that initially suggested 6:6 in the Ultimatum game, which reflects a bit of Law I'll describe later - but once you get that notion of fairness from somewhere, and put a system like this around it, no seller has an incentive to claim an unfairly high fair price, and no buyer has an incentive to claim an unfairly low fair price.  And if they happen to honestly disagree about that anyways, in some ambiguous situation, they'll still complete the transaction with very high probability so long as they only disagree a little."

"That, roughly, is how bargaining works in dath ilan over one-time trades:  If somebody offers a price the other side is unreasonable, the other side says, 'That strikes us as an unfair division of gains, even if mutually beneficial as such; but if you made that your final offer, we'd generate a visible random number and accept with 10% probability'.  And then the price-setting side can potentially offer further arguments about why the trade is more valuable than it looks, or make a better offer, or accept that low probability."

"The bargaining process Carissa described earlier, for selling my shirt, sounded like - people were probably trying to sort of flail at that underlying structure, by acting like they might be very unlikely to take an offer, or be moderately likely to take an offer, as they got closer to an agreeable price?  But with a lot more... weirdness, acting, in Baseline we'd say 'LARPing'.  Maybe because they think they have to pretend a lowball offer isn't mutually beneficial at all, in order to justify rejecting it; and also with some incentives to be misleading, because the underlying signals aren't as precise and legible as saying '10%'... and there's an incentive to exaggerate, but then the other side knows you're probably exaggerating, so you exaggerate even more, and you get people saying these exaggerated statements that both sides know aren't true, but there's uncertainty about how much the speaking side thinks they're really exaggerated, and modulating that uncertainty ends up being the medium of communication?  At least, that was my attempt to decode what Carissa described."

"Once you've arrived at a notion of a 'fair price' in some one-time trading situation where the seller sets a price and the buyer decides whether to accept, the seller doesn't have an incentive to say the fair price is higher than that; the buyer will accept with a lower probability that cancels out some of the seller's expected gains from trade.  The buyer also doesn't have an incentive to claim the fair price is lower than they think it really is.  The seller won't actually adjust their price, if they think a lower price is unfair, and the buyer will have to follow through by accepting with a lower probability, which destroys a big chunk of their own expected gains from trade, and doesn't get them a different price even if the random number says to accept."

"The initial notion of a fair price has to come from somewhere - from the part of yourself that initially suggested 6:6 in the Ultimatum game, which reflects a bit of Law I'll describe later - but once you get that notion of fairness from somewhere, and put a system like this around it, no seller has an incentive to claim an unfairly high fair price, and no buyer has an incentive to claim an unfairly low fair price.  And if they happen to honestly disagree about that anyways, in some ambiguous situation, they'll still complete the transaction with very high probability so long as they only disagree a little."

"That, roughly, is how bargaining works in dath ilan over one-time trades:  If somebody offers a price the other side is unreasonable, the other side says, 'That strikes us as an unfair division of gains, even if mutually beneficial as such; but if you made that your final offer, we'd generate a visible random number and accept with 10% probability'.  And then the price-setting side can potentially offer further arguments about why the trade is more valuable than it looks, or make a better offer, or accept that low probability."

"The bargaining process Carissa described earlier, for selling my shirt, sounded like - people were probably trying to sort of flail at that underlying structure, by acting like they might be very unlikely to take an offer, or be moderately likely to take an offer, as they got closer to an agreeable price?  But with a lot more... weirdness, acting, in Baseline we'd say 'LARPing'.  Maybe because they think they have to pretend a lowball offer isn't mutually beneficial at all, in order to justify rejecting it; and also with some incentives to be misleading, because the underlying signals aren't as precise and legible as saying '10%'... and there's an incentive to exaggerate, but then the other side knows you're probably exaggerating, so you exaggerate even more, and you get people saying these exaggerated statements that both sides know aren't true, but there's uncertainty about how much the speaking side thinks they're really exaggerated, and modulating that uncertainty ends up being the medium of communication?  At least, that was my attempt to decode what Carissa described."

"Once you've arrived at a notion of a 'fair price' in some one-time trading situation where the seller sets a price and the buyer decides whether to accept, the seller doesn't have an incentive to say the fair price is higher than that; the buyer will accept with a lower probability that cancels out some of the seller's expected gains from trade.  The buyer also doesn't have an incentive to claim the fair price is lower than they think it really is.  The seller won't actually adjust their price, if they think a lower price is unfair, and the buyer will have to follow through by accepting with a lower probability, which destroys a big chunk of their own expected gains from trade, and doesn't get them a different price even if the random number says to accept."

"The initial notion of a fair price has to come from somewhere - from the part of yourself that initially suggested 6:6 in the Ultimatum game, which reflects a bit of Law I'll describe later - but once you get that notion of fairness from somewhere, and put a system like this around it, no seller has an incentive to claim an unfairly high fair price, and no buyer has an incentive to claim an unfairly low fair price.  And if they happen to honestly disagree about that anyways, in some ambiguous situation, they'll still complete the transaction with very high probability so long as they only disagree a little."

"That, roughly, is how bargaining works in dath ilan over one-time trades:  If somebody offers a price the other side thinks unreasonable, the other side says, 'That strikes us as an unfair division of gains, even if mutually beneficial as such; but if you made that your final offer, we'd generate a visible random number and accept with 10% probability'.  And then the price-setting side can potentially offer further arguments about why the trade is more valuable than it looks, or make a better offer, or accept that low probability."

"The bargaining process Carissa described earlier, for selling my shirt, sounded like - people were probably trying to sort of flail at that underlying structure, by acting like they might be very unlikely to take an offer, or be moderately likely to take an offer, as they got closer to an agreeable price?  But with a lot more... weirdness, acting, in Baseline we'd say 'LARPing'.  Maybe because they think they have to pretend a lowball offer isn't mutually beneficial at all, in order to justify rejecting it; and also with some incentives to be misleading, because the underlying signals aren't as precise and legible as saying '10%'... and there's an incentive to exaggerate, but then the other side knows you're probably exaggerating, so you exaggerate even more, and you get people saying these exaggerated statements that both sides know aren't true, but there's uncertainty about how much the speaking side thinks they're really exaggerated, and modulating that uncertainty ends up being the medium of communication?  At least, that was my attempt to decode what Carissa described."