Sometime even later, Thellim is going to conclude that maybe it's not the moon. She will then wonder if there's any way to explain to Earth economists how the absolute basics of negotiation work in coherent decision systems (eg those consistent under reflection in the presence of correlated agents and/or models of agents). Or even, like, get them interested in what sort of 'irrational' behavior rational agents want to have 'reputations' for having, and if there's any systematic structure in there that might possibly be interesting.
It turns out that Earth economists are locked into powerful incentive structures of status and shame, which prevent them from discussing the economic work of anybody who doesn't get their paper into a journal. The journals are locked into very powerful incentive structures that prevent them from accepting papers unless they're written in a very weird Earth way that Thellim can't manage to imitate, and also, Thellim hasn't gotten tenure at a prestigious university which means they'll probably reject the paper anyways. Thellim asks if she can just rent temporary tenure and buy somebody else's work to write the paper, and gets basically the same response as if she asked for roasted children recipes.
The system expects knowledge to be contributed to it only by people who have undergone painful trials to prove themselves worthy. If you haven't proven yourself worthy in that way, the system doesn't want your knowledge even for free, because, if the system acknowledged your contribution, it cannot manage not to give you status, even if you offer to sign a form relinquishing it, and it would be bad and unfair for anyone to get that status without undergoing the pains and trials that others had to pay to get it.
Thellim could maybe solve this problem if she put around five years of her life into taking the knowledge, and putting it into a form where the system thinks it's allowed to ever look at it or talk about it without that being shameful. But Earth has problems that are plausibly more important than their entire field of economics being firmly convinced that a particular set of crazy behaviors are 'rational' and that the only healthy and prosocial behaviors are 'irrational'.
She ends up writing a handful of blog posts about it, tossing mentions of it into a couple of stories she writes on the side, and otherwise leaving Earth to its fate there; Earth has rather a lot of awful fates going on simultaneously, and that one is not literally their most important problem.
Sometime even later, Thellim is going to conclude that maybe it's not the moon. She will then wonder if there's any way to explain to Earth economists how the absolute basics of negotiation work in coherent decision systems (eg those consistent under reflection in the presence of correlated agents and/or models of agents). Or even, like, get them interested in what sort of 'irrational' behavior rational agents want to have 'reputations' for having, and if there's any systematic structure in there that might possibly be interesting.
It turns out that Earth economists are locked into powerful incentive structures of status and shame, which prevent them from discussing the economic work of anybody who doesn't get their paper into a journal. The journals are locked into very powerful incentive structures that prevent them from accepting papers unless they're written in a very weird Earth way that Thellim can't manage to imitate, and also, Thellim hasn't gotten tenure at a prestigious university which means they'll probably reject the paper anyways. Thellim asks if she can just rent temporary tenure and buy somebody else's work to write the paper, and gets basically the same response as if she asked for roasted children recipes.
The system expects knowledge to be contributed to it only by people who have undergone painful trials to prove themselves worthy. If you haven't proven yourself worthy in that way, the system doesn't want your knowledge even for free, because, if the system acknowledged your contribution, it cannot manage not to give you status, even if you offer to sign a form relinquishing it, and it would be bad and unfair for anyone to get that status without undergoing the pains and trials that others had to pay to get it.
Thellim could maybe solve this problem if she put around five years of her life into taking the knowledge, and putting it into a form where the system thinks it's allowed to ever look at it or talk about it without that being shameful. But Earth has problems that are plausibly more important than their entire field of economics being firmly convinced that a particular set of crazy behaviors are 'rational' and that healthy, prosocial, equilibrium-solvable behaviors are 'irrational'.
She ends up writing a handful of blog posts about it, tossing mentions of it into a couple of stories she writes on the side, and otherwise leaving Earth to its fate there; Earth has rather a lot of awful fates going on simultaneously, and that one is not literally their most important problem.
Sometime even later, Thellim is going to conclude that maybe it's not the moon. She will then wonder if there's any way to explain to Earth economists how the absolute basics of negotiation work in coherent decision systems (eg those consistent under reflection in the presence of correlated agents and/or models of agents). Or even, minimally, get them interested in what sort of 'irrational' behavior rational agents want to have 'reputations' for having, and if there's any systematic structure in there that might possibly be interesting.
It turns out that Earth economists are locked into powerful incentive structures of status and shame, which prevent them from discussing the economic work of anybody who doesn't get their paper into a journal. The journals are locked into very powerful incentive structures that prevent them from accepting papers unless they're written in a very weird Earth way that Thellim can't manage to imitate, and also, Thellim hasn't gotten tenure at a prestigious university which means they'll probably reject the paper anyways. Thellim asks if she can just rent temporary tenure and buy somebody else's work to write the paper, and gets basically the same response as if she asked for roasted children recipes.
The system expects knowledge to be contributed to it only by people who have undergone painful trials to prove themselves worthy. If you haven't proven yourself worthy in that way, the system doesn't want your knowledge even for free, because, if the system acknowledged your contribution, it cannot manage not to give you status, even if you offer to sign a form relinquishing it, and it would be bad and unfair for anyone to get that status without undergoing the pains and trials that others had to pay to get it.
Thellim could maybe solve this problem if she put around five years of her life into taking the knowledge, and putting it into a form where the system thinks it's allowed to ever look at it or talk about it without that being shameful. But Earth has problems that are plausibly more important than their entire field of economics being firmly convinced that a particular set of crazy behaviors are 'rational' and that healthy, prosocial, equilibrium-solvable behaviors are 'irrational'.
She ends up writing a handful of blog posts about it, tossing mentions of it into a couple of stories she writes on the side, and otherwise leaving Earth to its fate there; Earth has rather a lot of awful fates going on simultaneously, and that one is not literally their most important problem.
Sometime even later, Thellim is going to conclude that maybe it's not the moon. She will then wonder if there's any way to explain to Earth economists how the absolute basics of negotiation work in coherent decision systems (eg those consistent under reflection in the presence of correlated agents and/or models of agents). Or even, minimally, get them interested in what sort of 'irrational' behavior rational agents want to have 'reputations' for having, and if there's any systematic structure in there that might possibly be interesting.
It turns out that Earth economists are locked into powerful incentive structures of status and shame, which prevent them from discussing the economic work of anybody who doesn't get their paper into a journal. The journals are locked into very powerful incentive structures that prevent them from accepting papers unless they're written in a very weird Earth way that Thellim can't manage to imitate, and also, Thellim hasn't gotten tenure at a prestigious university which means they'll probably reject the paper anyways. Thellim asks if she can just rent temporary tenure and buy somebody else's work to write the paper, and gets approximately the same response as if she asked for roasted children recipes.
The system expects knowledge to be contributed to it only by people who have undergone painful trials to prove themselves worthy. If you haven't proven yourself worthy in that way, the system doesn't want your knowledge even for free, because, if the system acknowledged your contribution, it cannot manage not to give you status, even if you offer to sign a form relinquishing it, and it would be bad and unfair for anyone to get that status without undergoing the pains and trials that others had to pay to get it.
Thellim could maybe solve this problem if she put around five years of her life into taking the knowledge, and putting it into a form where the system thinks it's allowed to ever look at it or talk about it without that being shameful. But Earth has problems that are plausibly more important than their entire field of economics being firmly convinced that a particular set of crazy behaviors are 'rational' and that healthy, prosocial, equilibrium-solvable behaviors are 'irrational'.
She ends up writing a handful of blog posts about it, tossing mentions of it into a couple of stories she writes on the side, and otherwise leaving Earth to its fate there; Earth has rather a lot of awful fates going on simultaneously, and that one is not literally their most important problem.
Sometime even later, Thellim is going to conclude that maybe it's not the moon. She will then wonder if there's any way to explain to Earth economists how the absolute basics of negotiation work in coherent decision systems (eg those consistent under reflection in the presence of correlated agents and/or models of agents). Or even, minimally, get them interested in what sort of 'irrational' behavior rational agents want to have 'reputations' for having, and if there's any systematic structure in there that might possibly be interesting.
It turns out that Earth economists are locked into powerful incentive structures of status and shame, which prevent them from discussing the economic work of anybody who doesn't get their paper into a journal. The journals are locked into very powerful incentive structures that prevent them from accepting papers unless they're written in a very weird Earth way that Thellim can't manage to imitate, and also, Thellim hasn't gotten tenure at a prestigious university which means they'll probably reject the paper anyways. Thellim asks if she can just rent temporary tenure and buy somebody else's work to write the paper, and gets approximately the same response as if she asked for roasted children recipes.
The system expects knowledge to be contributed to it only by people who have undergone painful trials to prove themselves worthy. If you haven't proven yourself worthy in that way, the system doesn't want your knowledge even for free, because, if the system acknowledged your contribution, it cannot manage not to give you status, even if you offer to sign a form relinquishing it, and it would be bad and unfair for anyone to get that status without undergoing the pains and trials that others had to pay to get it.
She went and talked about it online before she'd realized the full depth of this problem, and now nobody else can benefit from writing it up, because it would be her idea and she would get the status for it and she's not allowed to have that status. Furthermore, nobody else would put in the huge effort to push forward the idea if she'll capture their pay in status. It does have to be a huge effort; the system is set up to provide resistance to ideas, and disincentivize people who quietly agreed with those ideas from advocating them, until that resistance is overcome. This ensures that pushing any major idea takes a huge effort that the idea-owner has to put in themselves, so that nobody will be rewarded with status unless they have dedicated several years to pushing an idea through a required initial ordeal before anyone with existing status is allowed to help, thereby proving themselves admirable enough and dedicated enough to have as much status as would come from contributing a major idea.
To suggest that the system should work in any different way is an obvious plot to steal status from those who worked harder, played by the rules properly, and deserve status more.
Thellim could maybe solve this problem if she put around five years of her life into taking the knowledge, and putting it into a form where the system thinks it's allowed to ever look at it or talk about it without that being shameful. But Earth has problems that are plausibly more important than their entire field of economics being firmly convinced that a particular set of crazy behaviors are 'rational' and that healthy, prosocial, equilibrium-solvable behaviors are 'irrational'.
She ends up writing a handful of blog posts about it, tossing mentions of it into a couple of stories she writes on the side, and otherwise leaving Earth to its fate there; Earth has rather a lot of awful fates going on simultaneously, and that one is not literally their most important problem.
Sometime even later, Thellim is going to conclude that maybe it's not the moon. She will then wonder if there's any way to explain to Earth economists how the absolute basics of negotiation work in coherent decision systems (eg those consistent under reflection in the presence of correlated agents and/or models of agents). Or even, minimally, get them interested in what sort of 'irrational' behavior rational agents want to have 'reputations' for having, and if there's any systematic structure in there that might possibly be interesting.
It turns out that Earth economists are locked into powerful incentive structures of status and shame, which prevent them from discussing the economic work of anybody who doesn't get their paper into a journal. The journals are locked into very powerful incentive structures that prevent them from accepting papers unless they're written in a very weird Earth way that Thellim can't manage to imitate, and also, Thellim hasn't gotten tenure at a prestigious university which means they'll probably reject the paper anyways. Thellim asks if she can just rent temporary tenure and buy somebody else's work to write the paper, and gets approximately the same response as if she asked for roasted children recipes.
The system expects knowledge to be contributed to it only by people who have undergone painful trials to prove themselves worthy. If you haven't proven yourself worthy in that way, the system doesn't want your knowledge even for free, because, if the system acknowledged your contribution, it cannot manage not to give you status, even if you offer to sign a form relinquishing it, and it would be bad and unfair for anyone to get that status without undergoing the pains and trials that others had to pay to get it.
She went and talked about logical decision theory online before she'd realized the full depth of this problem, and now nobody else can benefit from writing it up, because it would be her idea and she would get the status for it and she's not allowed to have that status. Furthermore, nobody else would put in the huge effort to push forward the idea if she'll capture their pay in status. It does have to be a huge effort; the system is set up to provide resistance to ideas, and disincentivize people who quietly agreed with those ideas from advocating them, until that resistance is overcome. This ensures that pushing any major idea takes a huge effort that the idea-owner has to put in themselves, so that nobody will be rewarded with status unless they have dedicated several years to pushing an idea through a required initial ordeal before anyone with existing status is allowed to help, thereby proving themselves admirable enough and dedicated enough to have as much status as would come from contributing a major idea.
To suggest that the system should work in any different way is an obvious plot to steal status from those who worked harder, played by the rules properly, and deserve status more.
Thellim could maybe solve this problem if she put around five years of her life into taking the knowledge, and putting it into a form where the system thinks it's allowed to ever look at it or talk about it without that being shameful. But Earth has problems that are plausibly more important than their entire field of economics being firmly convinced that a particular set of crazy behaviors are 'rational' and that healthy, prosocial, equilibrium-solvable behaviors are 'irrational'.
She ends up writing a handful of blog posts about it, tossing mentions of it into a couple of stories she writes on the side, and otherwise leaving Earth to its fate there; Earth has rather a lot of awful fates going on simultaneously, and that one is not literally their most important problem.
Sometime even later, Thellim is going to conclude that maybe it's not the moon. She will then wonder if there's any way to explain to Earth economists how the absolute basics of negotiation work in coherent decision systems (eg those consistent under reflection in the presence of correlated agents and/or models of agents). Or even, minimally, get them interested in what sort of 'irrational' behavior rational agents want to have 'reputations' for having, and if there's any systematic structure in there that might possibly be interesting.
It turns out that Earth economists are locked into powerful incentive structures of status and shame, which prevent them from discussing the economic work of anybody who doesn't get their paper into a journal. The journals are locked into very powerful incentive structures that prevent them from accepting papers unless they're written in a very weird Earth way that Thellim can't manage to imitate, and also, Thellim hasn't gotten tenure at a prestigious university which means they'll probably reject the paper anyways. Thellim asks if she can just rent temporary tenure and buy somebody else's work to write the paper, and gets approximately the same response as if she asked for roasted children recipes.
The system expects knowledge to be contributed to it only by people who have undergone painful trials to prove themselves worthy. If you haven't proven yourself worthy in that way, the system doesn't want your knowledge even for free, because, if the system acknowledged your contribution, it cannot manage not to give you status, even if you offer to sign a form relinquishing it, and it would be bad and unfair for anyone to get that status without undergoing the pains and trials that others had to pay to get it.
She went and talked about logical decision theory online before she'd realized the full depth of this problem, and now nobody else can benefit from writing it up, because it would be her idea and she would get the status for it and she's not allowed to have that status. Furthermore, nobody else would put in the huge effort to push forward the idea if she'll capture their pay in status. It does have to be a huge effort; the system is set up to provide resistance to ideas, and disincentivize people who quietly agreed with those ideas from advocating them, until that resistance is overcome. This ensures that pushing any major idea takes a huge effort that the idea-owner has to put in themselves, so that nobody will be rewarded with status unless they have dedicated several years to pushing an idea through a required initial ordeal before anyone with existing status is allowed to help, thereby proving themselves admirable enough and dedicated enough to have as much status as would come from contributing a major idea.
To suggest that the system should work in any different way is an obvious plot to steal status that is only deserved by virtuous people who work hard, play by the proper rules, and don't try to cheat or take shortcuts.
Thellim could maybe solve this problem if she put around five years of her life into taking the knowledge, and putting it into a form where the system thinks it's allowed to ever look at it or talk about it without that being shameful. But Earth has problems that are plausibly more important than their entire field of economics being firmly convinced that a particular set of crazy behaviors are 'rational' and that healthy, prosocial, equilibrium-solvable behaviors are 'irrational'.
She ends up writing a handful of blog posts about it, tossing mentions of it into a couple of stories she writes on the side, and otherwise leaving Earth to its fate there; Earth has rather a lot of awful fates going on simultaneously, and that one is not literally their most important problem.
Sometime even later, Thellim is going to conclude that maybe it's not the moon. She will then wonder if there's any way to explain to Earth economists how the absolute basics of negotiation work in coherent decision systems (eg those consistent under reflection in the presence of correlated agents and/or models of agents). Or even, minimally, get them interested in what sort of 'irrational' behavior rational agents want to have 'reputations' for having, and if there's any systematic structure in there that might possibly be interesting.
It turns out that Earth economists are locked into powerful incentive structures of status and shame, which prevent them from discussing the economic work of anybody who doesn't get their paper into a journal. The journals are locked into very powerful incentive structures that prevent them from accepting papers unless they're written in a very weird Earth way that Thellim can't manage to imitate, and also, Thellim hasn't gotten tenure at a prestigious university which means they'll probably reject the paper anyways. Thellim asks if she can just rent temporary tenure and buy somebody else's work to write the paper, and gets approximately the same response as if she asked for roasted children recipes.
The system expects knowledge to be contributed to it only by people who have undergone painful trials to prove themselves worthy. If you haven't proven yourself worthy in that way, the system doesn't want your knowledge even for free, because, if the system acknowledged your contribution, it cannot manage not to give you status, even if you offer to sign a form relinquishing it, and it would be bad and unfair for anyone to get that status without undergoing the pains and trials that others had to pay to get it.
She went and talked about logical decision theory online before she'd realized the full depth of this problem, and now nobody else can benefit from writing it up, because it would be her idea and she would get the status for it and she's not allowed to have that status. Furthermore, nobody else would put in the huge effort to push forward the idea if she'll capture their pay in status. It does have to be a huge effort; the system is set up to provide resistance to ideas, and disincentivize people who quietly agreed with those ideas from advocating them, until that resistance is overcome. This ensures that pushing any major idea takes a huge effort that the idea-owner has to put in themselves, so that nobody will be rewarded with status unless they have dedicated several years to pushing an idea through a required initial ordeal before anyone with existing status is allowed to help, thereby proving themselves admirable enough and dedicated enough to have as much status as would come from contributing a major idea.
To suggest that the system should work in any different way is an obvious plot to steal status that is only deserved by virtuous people who work hard, play by the proper rules, and don't try to cheat by doing anything with less effort than it's supposed to take.
Thellim could maybe solve this problem if she put around five years of her life into taking the knowledge, and putting it into a form where the system thinks it's allowed to ever look at it or talk about it without that being shameful. But Earth has problems that are plausibly more important than their entire field of economics being firmly convinced that a particular set of crazy behaviors are 'rational' and that healthy, prosocial, equilibrium-solvable behaviors are 'irrational'.
She ends up writing a handful of blog posts about it, tossing mentions of it into a couple of stories she writes on the side, and otherwise leaving Earth to its fate there; Earth has rather a lot of awful fates going on simultaneously, and that one is not literally their most important problem.
Sometime even later, Thellim is going to conclude that maybe it's not the moon. She will then wonder if there's any way to explain to Earth economists how the absolute basics of negotiation work in coherent decision systems (eg those consistent under reflection in the presence of correlated agents and/or models of agents). Or even, minimally, get them interested in what sort of 'irrational' behavior rational agents want to have 'reputations' for having, and if there's any systematic structure in there that might possibly be interesting.
It turns out that Earth economists are locked into powerful incentive structures of status and shame, which prevent them from discussing the economic work of anybody who doesn't get their paper into a journal. The journals are locked into very powerful incentive structures that prevent them from accepting papers unless they're written in a very weird Earth way that Thellim can't manage to imitate, and also, Thellim hasn't gotten tenure at a prestigious university which means they'll probably reject the paper anyways. Thellim asks if she can just rent temporary tenure and buy somebody else's work to write the paper, and gets approximately the same reaction as if she asked for roasted children recipes.
The system expects knowledge to be contributed to it only by people who have undergone painful trials to prove themselves worthy. If you haven't proven yourself worthy in that way, the system doesn't want your knowledge even for free, because, if the system acknowledged your contribution, it cannot manage not to give you status, even if you offer to sign a form relinquishing it, and it would be bad and unfair for anyone to get that status without undergoing the pains and trials that others had to pay to get it.
She went and talked about logical decision theory online before she'd realized the full depth of this problem, and now nobody else can benefit from writing it up, because it would be her idea and she would get the status for it and she's not allowed to have that status. Furthermore, nobody else would put in the huge effort to push forward the idea if she'll capture their pay in status. It does have to be a huge effort; the system is set up to provide resistance to ideas, and disincentivize people who quietly agreed with those ideas from advocating them, until that resistance is overcome. This ensures that pushing any major idea takes a huge effort that the idea-owner has to put in themselves, so that nobody will be rewarded with status unless they have dedicated several years to pushing an idea through a required initial ordeal before anyone with existing status is allowed to help, thereby proving themselves admirable enough and dedicated enough to have as much status as would come from contributing a major idea.
To suggest that the system should work in any different way is an obvious plot to steal status that is only deserved by virtuous people who work hard, play by the proper rules, and don't try to cheat by doing anything with less effort than it's supposed to take.
Thellim could maybe solve this problem if she put around five years of her life into taking the knowledge, and putting it into a form where the system thinks it's allowed to ever look at it or talk about it without that being shameful. But Earth has problems that are plausibly more important than their entire field of economics being firmly convinced that a particular set of crazy behaviors are 'rational' and that healthy, prosocial, equilibrium-solvable behaviors are 'irrational'.
She ends up writing a handful of blog posts about it, tossing mentions of it into a couple of stories she writes on the side, and otherwise leaving Earth to its fate there; Earth has rather a lot of awful fates going on simultaneously, and that one is not literally their most important problem.
