Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue-circle-worlds!  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring, lidless eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-prioritied world might regard as unnervingly eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences.  Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they might guess even in advance of observing it; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one silver piece each time they want to teleport to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again - in case anyone can see the point before I speak it - how can knowing necessary truths save you money?"

Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue-circle-worlds!  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring, lidless eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-prioritied world might regard as unnervingly eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences.  Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they might guess even in advance of observing it; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one silver piece each time they want to teleport to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again, in case anyone can see the point before I speak it:  How can knowing necessary truths save you money?"

Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue-circle-worlds!  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring, lidless eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-prioritied world might regard as eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences.  Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they might guess even in advance of observing it; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one silver piece each time they want to teleport to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again, in case anyone can see the point before I speak it:  How can knowing necessary truths save you money?"

Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue-circle-worlds!  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring, lidless eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-prioritied world might regard as eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences."

"Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they might guess even in advance of observing it; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one silver piece each time they want to teleport to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again, in case anyone can see the point before I speak it:  How can knowing necessary truths save you money?"

Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue-circle-worlds!  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring, lidless eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-prioritied world might regard as eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences."

"Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they could guess even in advance of observing; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one silver piece each time they want to teleport to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again, in case anyone can see the point before I speak it:  How can knowing necessary truths save you money?"

Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue-circle-worlds!  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring, lidless eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-prioritied world might regard as eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences."

"Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they could guess even in advance of observing; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one labor... one silver piece each time they want to teleport to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again, in case anyone can see the point before I speak it:  How can knowing necessary truths save you money?"

Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue-circle-worlds!  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring, lidless eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-prioritied world might regard as eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences."

"Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they could guess even in advance of observing; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one labor... one silver piece each time they want to teleport to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again, in case anyone has seen the point before I speak it:  How can knowing necessary truths save you money?"

Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue-circle-worlds!  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring, lidless eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-prioritied world might regard as eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences."

"Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they could guess even in advance of observing; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one labor... one silver piece each time they want to teleport to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again, in case anyone has seen the point before I speak it:  How can knowing necessary truths save you money?"

Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue-circle-worlds.  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring, lidless eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-prioritied world might regard as eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences."

"Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they could guess even in advance of observing; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one labor... one silver piece each time they want to teleport to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again, in case anyone has seen the point before I speak it:  How can knowing necessary truths save you money?"

Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue circle-worlds.  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring, lidless eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-prioritied world might regard as eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences."

"Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they could guess even in advance of observing; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one labor... one silver piece each time they want to teleport to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again, in case anyone has seen the point before I speak it:  How can knowing necessary truths save you money?"

Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue circle-worlds.  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring, lidless eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-prioritied world might regard as eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences."

"Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they could guess even in advance of observing; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one labor... one silver piece each time they want to move to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again, in case anyone has seen the point before I speak it:  How can knowing necessary truths save you money?"

Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue circle-worlds.  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring, lidless eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-troped world might regard as eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences."

"Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they could guess even in advance of observing; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one labor... one silver piece each time they want to move to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again, in case anyone has seen the point before I speak it:  How can knowing necessary truths save you money?"

Keltham goes to the whiteboard and draws some conscious observers inside his blue circle-worlds.  Much as some other world might indicate observers with smiley-faces, dath ilani convention calls for Keltham to draw a number of glaring eyes inside his worlds, creating a tableau that somebody from a differently-troped world might regard as eldritch.

"Well, now I've put some conscious observers inside these worlds!  Not that my tiny drawings embody real experiences, of course, they're not detailed enough drawings for that; so now these pictures are no longer being drawn in full detail, which is something we might need to watch out for if this was a more complicated debate about conscious experiences."

"Some of these observers, in the worlds where Z is actually true, might see twenty triangles being red, and zero triangles being green, and hypothesize a general law: all triangles are red.  They might be able to deduce, without having to actually scry into other planes, that Z was not a necessary truth; they might be able to cast illusions, draw on walls, or just use their imaginations to see that.  So they would not be certain that all triangles are red.  For all they know, the world might up and present them one day with a green triangle.  But the next time they saw a triangle, even if their world made them slower to see colors than shapes, they could guess even in advance of observing; they would guess the triangle was red."

"Let's also suppose that you can tell whether an object is small or large, but it's an expensive measurement; an observer has to actually wander over close to the object, to determine its size; because if they're looking at the object from a distance, they're not sure if it's nearby and small, or large and far away.  These observers have only one eye, as you can see; no binocular vision for tracking distances.  Let's say they have to pay one labor... one silver piece each time they want to move to an object."

"In worlds where H is true, observers who pay to measure a few red things will find, that of all the red things they have measured, every one of those red things was large."

"Now let me ask again, in case anyone has seen the point before I speak it:  How can knowing necessary truths save you money?"